Public summary of the meeting
on
28th February 2001
The Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) met in
London on 28 February 2001.
Council decisions and imports
Epidemiology and testing
Members considered current and future proposals for active BSE
surveillance of UK cattle using diagnostic tests on cattle brains.
Under new EU regulations, annual testing of 9,000 UK fallen cattle
aged over thirty months began in January 2001 (Fallen cattle are
animals which are found dead on farm - these animals are not subject
to veterinary inspection and hence are not allowed to enter the
human food chain regardless of the OTMS). Members noted that under
recent EU decisions, the UK will almost certainly be required to
test all OTM fallen cattle (75,000 animals annually estimated for
GB); OTMS cattle born August 96-July 97 (100,000 GB animals annually)
and from later this year, all casualty animals (100,000 GB animals
annually).
Members considered the plans for, and the results of, BSE testing
in other EU Member States. All cattle over thirty months of age
entering the food chain must now be tested for the presence of BSE
prions using one of three approved diagnostic tests. Other than
the small number of cattle that are slaughtered under the Beef Assurance
Scheme, this testing does not apply to the UK because OTM cattle
are not permitted to enter the human food chain here. Members agreed
that the current diagnostic tests are useful tools for epidemiological
surveillance and would help to give much better data on the distribution
of BSE in the EU. However, the tests had limited public health protection
value when used to screen out infected cattle in abattoirs. To date,
the tests had only been validated using brain material derived from
animals with clinical BSE. Although the Committee considered that
the current diagnostic tests would be able to detect BSE infection
in the late pre-clinical phase of disease (probably about three
months before clinical disease appears), infected cattle earlier
in the incubation period would not be detected by current testing
regimes being used in other Member States. Members emphasised the
pressing need to develop diagnostic tests that are able to detect
animals in the early phases of infection, and stressed the importance
of work to assess the sensitivity of BSE diagnostic tests throughout
the incubation period. This was an EU-wide issue.
Members expressed concern about results from a recent survey of
casualty animals over thirty months of age in Northern Ireland which
indicated evidence of BSE infection in about 2% of the 2546 animals
sampled. Although these samples were taken from a group of OTM cattle
which would not have entered the food chain, Members considered
that the results appeared to be at some variance with the low incidence
of reported clinical BSE in Northern Ireland and requested further
information at the next meeting.
Implementation of EU specified risk material legislation including
Pithing
Members were updated on progress in implementing the EU legislation
on specified risk material. They were informed that the extension
of the EU controls to include the entire intestine of all bovines
had been implemented in the UK from 01 January 2001 and that implementing
legislation was in place to ban pithing of cattle, sheep and goats
whose meat is intended for human or animal consumption from 01 April
2001.
In relation to this agenda item, Members asked for information
about the use of catgut, which is manufactured from cattle intestines
and used for surgical stitches in human and veterinary medicine.
In terms of human health, it was recognised that the medical use
of catgut sutures was being reviewed by the Medical Devices Agency
(MDA), an Executive Agency of the Department of Health. SEAC welcomed
the news that the MDA were in the process of informing the NHS about
the decision of the manufacturers to stop supplying catgut sutures
to the UK market. SEAC acknowledged that the decision to cease supply
of catgut sutures in the UK was facilitated by the adequate supply
of acceptable, alternative synthetic sutures. (Further
information on catgut sutures is available on the Medical Devices
Agency website). Members requested clarification of whether current
EU legislation classifying cattle ileum as a specified risk material
prevents it's use for cat gut and asked that further information
on its use in veterinary surgery should be provided at the next
meeting.)
Animal feed ban
Members considered a number of EU-wide animal feed regulations
which had been adopted temporarily in the light of the emerging
BSE epidemic elsewhere in Europe. The regulations currently apply
only until June 2001 and prohibit the feeding of processed animal
protein to all farmed livestock, as opposed to merely ruminants.
This brings Members States broadly in line with current UK legislation
adopted in 1996. SEAC strongly agreed that the widened EU feed ban
was beneficial to the protection of animal health and, in major
part, should be made permanent.
On specific animal feed issues, Members agreed that meal derived
from wild fish could be exempt from the feed ban. In order to prevent
intra-species recycling, meal derived from farmed fish should be
allowed only if it could be guaranteed that it would not be fed
to farmed fish, either directly or indirectly via meal from other
species. If this could not be guaranteed then it should not be used.
Imports of beef and beef products
The Committee was informed of the conclusions of a sub-group of
SEAC which had met on 05 December 2000 to consider the risk from
imported beef and beef products. The sub-group had welcomed the
introduction of an EU requirement that from 01 January 2001 cattle
aged over thirty months would not be allowed to enter the food chain
unless they had tested negative for BSE using one of the EU-approved
rapid tests. It had, however, expressed concern that, because of
the limitations of these tests, a negative result would not necessarily
mean that the animal was free of infection. The sub-group therefore
considered that the UK's over-thirty-month (OTM) rule should continue
to apply to imported meat until questions concerning the efficacy
of the tests had been resolved. The sub-group had also expressed
concern that the OTM rule did not apply to imports and sales of
processed meat products.
The FSA reported on the statements it had subsequently made, recommending
retention in the UK of the existing controls, including the OTM
rule, and advising that legally-sold imported French beef posed
no significantly greater risk than UK beef. The latter statement
had, however, made clear that processed meat products from countries
where BSE had been recorded might pose a slightly higher risk than
legally-sold carcase meat, because they might contain beef from
OTM animals. The FSA also informed the Committee that the EU SRM
rules would permit trade in bovine head meat from all EU Member
States except UK and Portugal.
In discussion, the Committee endorsed the conclusion of the sub-group
that the OTM rule should continue to apply to imported carcase meat
and confirmed that it continued to have a particular concern about
the safety of imported meat products, given that they were not covered
by the OTM rule. The Committee noted the FSA's statement on the
safety of imported beef, but suggested that the position on French
beef would need to be kept under review and that the assessment
of the risks from imports should be made more comprehensive and
include live animals. On bovine head meat, the Committee expressed
concern about the possibility of contamination by brain material
and recommended that a case for extending the SRM rules to include
the whole head be made to the European Commission.
Results of modelling work on BSE in Ireland and France
Dr Christl Donnelly of Imperial College presented interim modelling
work on BSE in the Republic of Ireland, using the techniques previously
applied to French data. While stressing that the work was not yet
complete and might be subject to change with additional information,
Dr Donnelly presented estimates* of the number of animals
which had been infected with BSE in Ireland and the number of these
which had been slaughtered for food. Assuming that BSE had been
under-reported in Ireland, her estimate was that, in the year 2000,
150 infected animals were slaughtered for human consumption in Ireland,
of which 72 were within 12 months of clinical onset of the disease
(the comparable estimates for UK and France being 1 and 52 respectively).
Taking account of herd sizes, the relative risks were roughly 99
times greater in Ireland than Great Britain, compared with roughly
24 times greater in France than Great Britain. If the OTM rule were
fully enforced, the risk of consuming Irish meat in the UK would
however be essentially zero, as none of the cattle within 12 months
of developing clinical disease would be consumed in the UK. But
if enforcement fell short, then the relative risk would rise in
proportion to the level of deficiency of enforcement. Overall, however,
the relative risk from Irish beef, even if no account were taken
of the OTM rule, was much lower than that from consumption of British
cattle before the OTM rule came into force in March 1996. Dr
Donnelly's final assessment of BSE risk in Irish beef was published
on the FSA website on 22 March 2001. The final results indicated
that a total of 159 animals estimated to have been within 12 months
of clinical symptoms of BSE entered the food chain in the Republic
of Ireland in 2000. The relative likelihood for carcase meat imported
from Ireland compared with that originating in Great Britain is
about twice if the OTM rule is enforced on 99% of imports as is
indicated by returns to the FSA.
Members considered current data on BSE cases in the UK and in other
EC Members States. The rising number of infected animals in other
Member States was a cause for concern, particularly the high proportion
of 1996 (and possibly 1998) born cases in Germany, which may imply
a continuing epidemic.
*These results were interim data which were
correct at the time of the meeting. The final results of Dr Donnelly's
work can now be found on :http://www.bsereview.org.uk/templates/latest/ite

Sheep
At its meeting in November 2000, SEAC
had agreed to set up a small sub group to consider the basic principles
underlying the National Scrapie Plan (NSP). Since then, the sub-group
had met and Members considered their conclusions, which noted that
there was increasing scientific evidence to suggest that animals
carrying the ARR allele of the prion protein gene, a version of
the gene which confers resistance to scrapie and experimental BSE,
were not sub-clinical reservoirs of infectivity. The subgroup agreed
that implementation of the NSP based on selective breeding to increase
the prevalence of the ARR allele in the national flock and decrease
the level of PrP genotypes known to be susceptible to scrapie was
a valid and important approach. The sub-group recommended that the
breeding programme should proceed and, in parallel, further work
should be undertaken to verify that sheep naturally exposed to scrapie
and sheep experimentally challenged with BSE, but carrying alleles
associated with resistance to TSEs do not harbour infectivity or
PrPSc in the absence of clinical
signs of disease. The sub-group considered that if experimental
results came to light that implied that genetically resistant sheep
were able to replicate and harbour the scrapie agent, the National
Scrapie Plan should be reviewed. SEAC accepted the conclusions of
the sub-group and endorsed their recommendations. A summary of the
sheep sub-group conclusions is given in the Annex
to this Public Summary.
SEAC also briefly considered current proposals of phase III of
the NSP concerning scrapie-affected flocks. SEAC agreed that dealing
with scrapie-affected flocks was the other important element of
the NSP to reduce levels of scrapie and that it was important, as
with the breeding for resistance scheme, to have a voluntary scheme
in the first instance. It was agreed that a SEAC subgroup should
consider phase III of the NSP in more detail and that their conclusions
would be fed back to the main Committee.
Risk assessment on small incinerators
In September 2000, Members had agreed the terms of reference for
an independent study on the potential risks to human health from
small incinerators burning SRM. A draft version of the report was
tabled which indicated that the risk from such incinerators would
be expected to be negligible. Because of a shortage of time and
the complexity of the subject, Members agreed to convene a small
working group to discuss the risk assessment in detail and report
back to the full Committee at the next meeting.
Current Health Issues
Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD) Update
The Committee conducted its regular review of epidemiological information
on vCJD. The Committee was informed that the total number of definite
or probable vCJD cases stood at 95, of whom 6 were still alive.
A number of geographically associated cases were being investigated
in conjunction with the National CJD Surveillance Unit, Communicable
Disease Surveillance Centre/Public Health Laboratory Service; the
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; and the Department
of Health. A national protocol to ensure consistency of investigation
of such cases was in an advanced stage of preparation. The Committee
noted that the trend showing a 20-30% increase, year-on-year, in
the number of vCJD cases was currently being maintained.
Safety of Human blood
The Committee considered a risk assessment of the potential impact
on vCJD person-to-person transmission of ceasing to use UK donor
plasma in the production of fresh frozen plasma (FFP). The Committee
accepted that if FFP were sourced from outside the UK, the theoretical
vCJD risk from FFP could be minimised further, but there might also
be an increased risk from other infectious agents associated with
such a change. It was explained that the Microbiological Safety
of Blood and Tissues for Transplantation (MSBT) Committee would
shortly be re-examining the risk assessment in the light of SEAC
views. The Committee did not dissent from the risk assessment's
conclusions, but considered that it was important for the report
to be set in context and reflect uncertainty.
More generally, SEAC noted and welcomed efforts being made to secure
the better use of blood so as to reduce the need for transfusion,
and research underway to develop synthetic alternatives.
Update on decontamination of surgical instruments
The Committee noted the Department
of Health press release of 04 January announcing new measures
to modernise NHS decontamination and sterilisation facilities and
introduce single use instruments for tonsil surgery, to further
minimise the theoretical risk of transmission of vCJD in hospitals.
SEAC welcomed consultations which were underway between the Department,
the Royal College of Surgeons, manufacturers of surgical equipment
and others to explore the possible introduction of single use instruments
for certain other procedures.
Update on CJD incidents panel
SEAC was updated on developments concerning the CJD Incidents Panel
following its second meeting on 22/23 February 2001. The Committee
was informed that the panel is drawing up guidance on the quarantine
of instruments and guidance on informing those who may have been
inadvertently exposed to vCJD.
SEAC/ACDP TSE Joint working group
This item was deferred until the next meeting in April.

DH R&D update
The Committee received its regular update on research sponsored
and commissioned by the Department of Health. In particular, it
noted a report on a recent meeting organised by the Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathy Joint Funders' Group to encourage research
on diagnostic tests, through bringing together academics, commercial
companies and others interested in this field. A call for proposals
for diagnostics would be issued soon.
MAFF R&D update
The Committee conducted its regular review of research findings
and epidemiological information on BSE. SEAC noted that in ongoing
experiments to examine the pathogenesis of experimental BSE in sheep,
Romney, Suffolk and Cheviot sheep of susceptible genotype had shown
evidence of infectivity in their tissues early in the incubation
period. However, encouragingly, no tissues from sheep ARR homozygote
sheep (i.e. animals carrying two copies of the ARR version of the
gene) had yet been found to be positive.
DELFIA results
Dr Barnard from Southampton General Hospital presented an overview
of the technology underlying the time resolved dissociation-enhanced
fluoroimmunoassay (DELFIA) diagnostic test for BSE. Initial technical
problems related to sample preparation which gave rise to an unexpectedly
high number of positive results had been resolved and the test was
now giving results which were consistent with those from histopatholical
examination, which is considered to be the most reliable standard
against which tests such as DELFIA are compared. The test is being
applied to samples collected from OTM animals.
Progress on the new study on bovine Milk
Members noted that all previous work, including mouse bioassay,
had found no detectable infectivity in milk. Members considered
the protocol of further experiments to examine milk for evidence
of BSE infectivity. Milk taken from cattle experimentally infected
with BSE would be concentrated and examined using a validated diagnostic
test. Members agreed that bioassaying samples in cattle or mice
would be a more sensitive test for infectivity than current immunologically-based
diagnostic techniques, and agreed that such evaluations should be
included.
Novel changes in red blood cell progenitors in TSEs
Discussion of this pre-publication paper was deferred because of
lack of time.
Internal Committee Items
Previously, SEAC had agreed to hold an open meeting in September
2001. Members briefly considered possible approaches to the meeting.
It was agreed to convene a small SEAC working group to consider
the arrangements in more detail.
All other Committee items were deferred because of a lack of time.
SEAC
March 2001

Annex
Summary of recommendations from the SEAC Subgroup: National Scrapie
Plan and risk reduction strategies (December 2000)
The National Scrapie Plan
1) The National Scrapie Plan should proceed but with the following
modifications:
- There should be urgent concurrent research to investigate the
theoretical possibility that animals that were genetically resistant
to developing clinical disease could be latent carriers of infection
in neural and non-neural tissues;
- There should be additional selection against the ARQ allele;
- The dairy sector should be brought into the programme as quickly
as practical;
- In the absence of evidence of BSE, there should be no move
to put the NSP on a compulsory footing, or announcement of any
firm intention to do so in the future, until such time that the
balance of evidence from research into possible latent carriers
clearly supports such a move;
- Results from such research should be reviewed as soon as it
is available;
- The basis of the scheme should be reviewed after one year in
the light of scientific knowledge at that time.
Risk reduction strategies and contingency planning for BSE in
sheep
2) The following strategy would provide some degree of assurance
for public health if BSE were to be found in a small number of sheep:
- only permit animals carrying at one least one ARR allele to
enter the food chain, and;
- couple this to an age cut off, perhaps 1 year of age, and;
- amend current SRM controls to remove intestine from the food
chain.
3) The strategy at (2) above should be built into the risk assessment
that the FSA are commissioning.
4) The strategy should be considered in terms of its viability
in relation to the whole national flock as any contingency plan
will need to deal with all sheep flocks.
5) If BSE were found in sheep, sheep and goats should not be used
for dairy production, with the exception of ARR homozygous sheep.